

# Remarks on Ceasefire Conditions & Circumstances

#### 28-06-96

# T's meeting with American Ambassador

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"What words they use are a matter for themselves, but they must convince people that they mean what they say."

[@Tab#2]

#### Comment

Again the 24 hour admission offer was prior to Lisburn.

#### 25-07-96

# Dáil Statement

text does not appear relevant to the issue

#### 11-09-96

# Taoiseach's Address to Congress in USA

"The all-party talks, for which we have worked so hard, have been delivered. We must have everybody there at those talks now, genuinely willing, and able, to negotiate. That can only

# Remarks on Ceasefire Conditions & Circumstances

At the Request of Mr. Hare I have compiled this compendium of remarks made by the Taoiseach (and some by the Tánaiste) concerning the conditions under which Sinn Féin could enter talks following a declaration by the IRA of a ceasefire.

## 06-06-96

# Official level meeting with SF

#### - item # 18

"Mr. Adams asked if it would be enough, so far as the Irish and British Governments were concerned, for the IRA to declare an unequivocal restoration of the August, 1994, ceasefire for Sinn Féin to be admitted to the negotiations. The official side indicated that it would." [@Tab#1]

#### Comment

the commitment given in June (prior to Lisburn bombing) could be argued to have been the position then, but IRA actions in wake of bombing now necessitate something more convincing.

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Again the 24 hour admission offer was prior to Lisburn.

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"The all-party talks, for which we have worked so hard, <u>have been delivered</u>. We must have everybody there at those talks now, genuinely willing, and able, to negotiate. **That can only** 

happen, when everyone has been convinced that violence will never be used again to intimidate opponents, or to control supporters. Never again.

That means a cessation of violence by the IRA that will hold in <u>all</u> circumstances. I know I have the full support of the United States Congress for that vital objective."

[@Tab#3]

#### Comment

The reference to the need to convince everyone that violence will never be used again might prove a hostage to fortune.

07-10-96 Bomb in Lisburn

# 10-10-96 Dáil Statement

"Some will, hopefully, argue that the Lisburn bomb may be a last spectacular, just to show what the IRA can do, as a preclude to calling a ceasefire. "The volunteers will need something to keep their morale going for a while, so a few people have to be killed" might be one way of putting it. If that is the calculation of the leaders, it hardly suggests that any ceasefire that follows it will involve a real acceptance of the Mitchell principles, by those who ordered the two Lisburn bombs. If that is the calculation, it hardly suggests that a new ceasefire will necessarily "hold in all circumstances". It hardly suggests that the Republican movement has transformed its analysis in any profound way.

#### 16-10-96

T's Meeting with Bill Flynn

The Taoiseach was uncomittal regarding a cooling off period. "he was deliberately not saying there will (or indeed that there wouldn't) be a cooling off period. ..... Instead he preferred to put it to them to convince us that this time the ceasefire was for real."

[@Tab#5]

#### 16-10-96

# Tánaiste's Address to the Seanad

He talks of an unequivocal ceasefire as the requirement and says "In the Downing Street Declaration and in the February Communiqué the two Governments set out that minimum threshold. We should certainly not lower it, and neither should we raise it to new and unrealistic heights."

[@Tab#6]

#### 23-10-96

# Dáil [no remarks in Dáil record - GC tells me the Q was disallowed, he was scripted to say, inter alia ...]

"I have said that it is for the Republican movement to find the words and the means to convince the rest of us as to "credibility". And I have said that the series of bombings, atrocities and other paramilitary actions over the past none months have made that a more difficult task." - NOT USED [@Tab#14]

#### 25-10-96

#### **Meeting with Sir Patrick Mayhew**

The T commented to Sir Patrick that there was "a case for Getting Sinn Féin and IRA to chose their own words that would convince others that, this time, the ceasefire was not just tactical." ....... "The Taoiseach again emphasised that it was the Irish Government's assessment that a three-month period was too long ....."

[@Tab#7]

#### 26-10-96

### T's phone conversation with John Major

"Now the situation is of course, that we have made it clear, both of us, that a ceasefire must be credible and not tactical and must hold in all circumstances. ....."
[@Tab#8]

# 30-10-96

# Dáil

"There is a clear statement in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the ground rules which determine eligibility for participation in the talks and as long as those paragraphs are complied with there is no bar to the participation of any party in the talks. .... It must show its commitment to the democratic process and politics is real and also establish that is committed to exclusively peaceful methods ..... it is for Sinn Féin to find a way to demonstrate to others its commitment to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the ground rules. It is important to repeat that any ceasefire has to be credible. It cannot be a tactical ceasefire to achieve a short term purpose. There must be a credible, unequivocal commitment to exclusively democratic political methods - exclusively means that all other methods are excluded." ...... Every IRA action makes an added difficulty, particularly in regard to paragraph 8 of the ground rules. ...

{The Taoiseach also said that he agreed with Deputy McDowell's remark that "the sense of any ceasefire will have to be that violence is over for good in layman's terms?"}

"The Mitchell principles ....... also exclude punishment beatings."
[@Tab#9]

#### 31-10-96

#### Dáil - Tánaiste

"... Sinn Féin would have to make clear its total and absolute commitment to the six Mitchell principles, including the complete renunciation of all violence and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations ...... There must be no contradictions between words and deeds. .... The Government's position is set out very clearly in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the ground rules."

[@Tab#10]

### Comment

what is meant by the underlined portion of the extract

#### 04-11-96

# T's Interview at opening of Hartstown Community School

"It is clear that there has to be an unequivocal ceasefire and that there has to be satisfaction that there is no going back and that this time the ceasefire is one that will last"
[@Tab#11]

#### Comment

He did not elaborate on "satisfaction" or say on whose part - i.e. who had to be satisfied.

### 05-11-96

#### Dáil

[@Tab#12]

#### 12-11-96

#### Dáil

"The criteria for participation in the multi-party talks were set out in the Joint Communiqué of 28 February and were subsequently restated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Ground Rules paper. They were in turn referred to in the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations) Act which, for the British side, forms the legal basis of the multi-party talks. Those remain the entry conditions."

**Supplementaries** 

"paragraphs eight and nine of the Ground Rules paper which sets out the criteria for eligibility ....... The terms of any such ceasefire announcement are important. .... important that those declaring the ceasefire .... find words .... which will convince those people and past victims of the IRA that, this time, the ceasefire is for good. .... .... The issue in regard to paragraph 9 is comparatively simple. .... whether there is a ceasefire. .... paragraph 8 there are evaluations to be made about the validity of the ceasefire ..... That is where the wording of any declaration of a ceasefire is particularly important. ..... A ceasefire that is purely tactical is not sufficient. .... a purely tactical ceasefire would not comply with paragraph 8 ...... .... .... .... .... If either side is to wait until it is satisfied beyond all doubt about the good faith of the other side, neither side will ever get started as far as the peace process is concerned. "

[@Tab#13]

A. J. Jordan 11-181196