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UNDER/SEG 62965  
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FROM: D J R HILL  
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT TEAM  
23 September 1996

Mr Stephens	cc	PS/Sir David Fell
		Mr Thomas o/r
		Mr Leach (B)
		Mr Bell
		Mr Watkins
		Mr Maccabe
		Mr Lavery
		Mr Whysall (B&L)
		Ms Mapstone
		Ms Bharucha

*he says  
it is gone within 15  
suspect his former col.  
had. no withdrawal  
Official support at hand  
point? ! doubt it, but  
will need to consider.*

SCENARIO BUILDING

*20  
11.1*

1. Mr Leach's submission of 20 September reports the current state of the trilateral relationship: the UUP are clearly looking for a lot more from both Governments and it was distinctly worrying that a moderate like Alan McFarland should be so firmly negative on the key question of whether any business could be done with Sinn Fein before decommissioning had started; the Irish have some reason to be gloomy and suspicious. It may be that McFarland's line did reflect a lack of familiarity with the leadership's current position, or the pressure he was clearly under from Hunter (and King); but the two Governments will both need reassurance during today, or most bets will be off.

2. Against that background I suspect that **some contingency planning would not be amiss.** The O hUiginn line seems to be that if a deal cannot be struck with the UUP in short order the issue should be put into plenary for a general debate. That does not strike me as a sensible course of action, but alternatives do not spring readily to mind. Would it be better simply to declare the negotiations suspended? Is there any way in which we could create more space/time for development of the trilateral relationship?

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3. I did wonder if we could play in the fate of the forum, which would of course need to be terminated if the negotiations were suspended - but that would need an affirmative resolution order so we could not act until Parliament had resumed. If no trilateral deal can be stitched up in the next couple of days we might suspend the negotiations and declare an intention to suspend the forum as soon as possible (ie by late October) as a way of putting pressure on the UUP to reach a deal.

4. More gloomily still, it seems to me that we could well face a situation in the near future in which the de facto IRA ceasefire in Northern Ireland is broken and the CLMC ceasefire has also broken down. What should our response be in such circumstances? My instinct would be to soldier on with the political talks, embracing the constitutional political parties; but that would require a positive and active political/presentational strategy. It could be that in those circumstances decommissioning would be less of an issue in the talks, having become in Sean O hUiginn's words "hypothetical", but it could still exert a baleful influence. Would there be any way of reducing that risk?

5. I apologise for the random nature of these thoughts. I look forward to an opportunity to discuss them with you and colleagues.

(Signed)

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