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ANNEX B

PAPER FROM JOHN HUME DATED 10 JANUARY 1997: TEXTUAL COMPARISON WITH  
THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF 28 NOVEMBER 1996

General: Adams' approach seems to have been to work on his own 10 October text and ignore HMG's statement of 28 November. A number of the differences between the texts reflect this and may not be significant in themselves.

1. Paragraph 1 of 28 November refers to the Thiepval bombing.  
(COMMENT: Essentially a drafting point).
2. Paragraph 2 of 28 November includes a reference to the purpose of the negotiations being to achieve a new beginning to relationships reflecting the three strands (COMMENT: Essentially drafting).
3. Paragraph 3 of 28 November - a couple of minor drafting points.
4. Paragraph 4 of 28 November - the first line contains a reference to "the need for sufficient consensus" in the negotiations, which is not reflected in the Hume paper. (COMMENT: No reason to think Sinn Fein could not live with such a reference)
5. Paragraph 4 of 28 November includes a reference to the outcome of negotiations being submitted to referendums, north and south, which is not reflected in the Hume paper. [Ditto]
6. Amendment 1 from the Hume paper omits references in the 28 November statement to the important contribution of the loyalist ceasefire and how it made it possible for loyalists to join the negotiations, etc. [Ditto]

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7. Amendment 1 from the Hume paper omits, from paragraph 6 of 28 November, a lengthy passage about the need for assurances that any new ceasefire would be genuinely unequivocal, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of 28 November about "words, actions and .... circumstances" and the process by which Sinn Fein would be accepted into talks. (COMMENT: Clearly a crucial omission).

8. Amendment 2 of the Hume paper picks up on earlier Irish suggestion that Sinn Fein should attend a preliminary talks session as soon as a ceasefire is called and Sinn Fein commits itself to exclusively peaceful methods (COMMENT: This clearly ignores the detailed steps in paragraph 8 of 28 November).

9. The third section of amendment 2 omits the reference in the 28 November statement to participants who are "no longer entitled to participate" in talks where they dishonour democratic principles. (COMMENT: Presentational change only)

10. Paragraph 7 of the 10 January paper. In the first line, the words "which must be resolved without blocking the negotiations" has been added after the phrase "Among the crucial issues is decommissioning", from the 28 November statement. (COMMENT: Recycling language used by the Prime Minister last year)

11. Paragraph 7 of the 10 January paper omits a large section from paragraph 11 of the 28 November statement which refers to the Mitchell compromise, states the two Governments' support for it, and refers to the need to reach agreement on carrying the compromise forward. The 10 January paper also has a repeat reference to tackling decommissioning "without blocking the negotiations". (COMMENT: The first is clearly a major omission).

12. Paragraph 9 of 10 January omits a reference to HMG encouraging agreement "over a period" through the negotiations. (COMMENT: Unlikely to be significant)

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13. Amendment 3 of the Hume paper aims to commit the two Governments to "an agreed timeframe and calendar for the conduct of negotiations", whereas the 28 November statement says that we will encourage "an agreed indicative timeframe". (COMMENT: Clearly way beyond what HMG regards as feasible)

14. Paragraph 12 of the Hume paper tries to commit HMG to ensuring "just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspiration of both communities ....." (COMMENT: Clearly beyond 28 November and what is realistic). Paragraph 12 also seeks "a policing service which can enjoy the support of the entire community" (COMMENT: a phrase we could not live with).

15. Amendment 5 of the Hume paper repeats verbatim the last paragraph of 28 November (COMMENT: and smacks of being a sop to HMG).

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