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TION PLAN

1. Await response from Hume, possibly suggesting more evidence of the Provisionals' intentions, perhaps in the form of language they may deploy.
2. Re-examine draft letter to Hume and draft Hume/Adams text in the light of Hume's response. Note if convincing evidence, perhaps in the form of a draft statement, is produced that a serious ceasefire is in prospect, there may be a case for modifying the crucial paragraph describing HMG's response to a ceasefire. (Note that as it stands it has not been seen by anyone outside HMG and could deter a ceasefire.) On the other hand if Hume produces no persuasive evidence this will suggest writing to him with the draft attached to the NI Paper and the text as approved by NI.
3. Amend text, decide whether or not it is HMG's definitive position and despatch to Hume.
4. If and when anything is sent to Hume, a copy should go to the Taoiseach's Department and to the NSC. There might be accompanying phone calls.
5. If the response from Hume enables us to produce a definitive text: i.e. one that we can say we will publish on the basis that in response there will be a ceasefire, the Prime Minister might wish to write personally to the US President and the Taoiseach to recruit their support to what is HMG's final position. (Drafts in preparation.)
6. UUP. The Prime Minister gave a commitment that Mr Trimble would be shown the text before it is published (but not necessarily before it is sent to Hume).
7. There is also a commitment to alert Ministerial colleagues before the text is made public.

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