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These papers were digitized by Dr Shelley Deane, Annabel Harris, Isha Pareek, Antoine Yenk, Ruth Murray and Eleanor Williams. We are very grateful to the library and archives staff at Bowdoin College for all their kindness and help in assembling this material, particularly Kat Stefko and Anne Sauer.
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{NIWC} {NIWC All vrofficial}
_North/South Council_
1. Responsibility for the particular functions (see Appendix) which are specified in the Agreement (and therefore in the legislation reflecting that Agreement at Westminster and in Dublin) would be exercised by a North/South Ministerial Council.
2. In respect of any such function\, the Council would consist of the relevant Minister(s) in each jurisdiction.
3. Decisions would be taken within the Council [on the basis of unanimity] [by agreement].
4. The Council would make such arrangements as it deemed appropriate to discharge its responsibilities\, whether through existing Departments/agencies in both jurisdictions [or otherwise] [ partnership between agencies or subsidiary bodies North/South and / or integrated allisland implementation bodies].
5. The Council would attract tranisation funding in its first three years through initial grants from the EU and the US in addition to any funding which might be provided by the British and Irish Governments.
6. [Thereafter the Council's proposals would have to be approved and the monies for implementation of those proposals voted by the legislatures in both Belfast and Dublin] [Thereafter the Council's annual programme and budget would be approved by legislatures in both Belfast and Dublin].
7. The Council would be held accountable for the proper and effective use of voted monies by a Public Accounts Committee comprising equal numbers of members of both legislatures.
8. In the circumstances where the Government either in Belfast or Dublin felt that good faith efforts were not being made to operate the arrangements or that the arrangements were being unreasonably breached\, that Government could refer the matter for adjudication by the European Court. The "breadth of functions" process in para 10 beneath would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
9. In the event of failure by the Government of Northern Ireland to comply with the Court's ruling\, a Commissioner would be appointed by the UK Government to discharge all the functions of a Minister and with the same powers and responsibilities. Monies for the discharge of the Commissioner's functions would be a first charge on monies voted by Westminister for the Government of Northern Ireland. The role of the Commissioner would cease immediately upon compliance with the Court's ruling.
10. In the event of failure by the Government of the Republic to comply with the Court's ruling\, the arrangements for the Council of Ministers in respect of the function(s) in question would be suspended pending compliance.
11. The Council of Ministers\, consisting in this instance of such Ministers as each administration might deem appropriate\, would meet at least once a year (or more frequently by agreement) to review the operation of the Council. The Council\, so constituted\, would be able to decide (again\, on the basis of unanimity) that\, where it was considered that it would be to the benefit of both jurisdictions\, functions should be added to or removed from those specified in the Agreement. Any such decision would have to be ratified by both legislatures. The above arrangements would apply to any additional functions.
_Notes_
1. Care has been taken to avoid the language in which the issue is usually discussed.
2. If anyone wished to do so\, the above arrangements could be regarded as 'freestanding'\, in the sense that they would depend on the originating Agreement and its related legislation. Any development of the scope of the arrangements would be by subsequent agreement.
3. Thereafter\, in their operation\, the arrangements are democratically accountable. Otherwise\, the existing democratic deficit in Northern Ireland would merely be extended to the whole island.
4. In their operation\, there is absolute symmetry between North and South. Both are equal partners.
5. Failure by _either_ party to operate the arrangements in good faith or unreasonable breach by _either_ party would be subject to _independent_ adjudication and would be subject to sanctions. It is difficult to devise symmetrical sanctions but the sanctions proposed in points 8 and 9 would be likely to provide an equivalence of deterrent effect.
APPENDIX- FUNCTIONS
Functions of the North/South Council would derive from the purpose of the Council
In fulfilling its functions the North/South Council would
Specific functions might include
31st March, 1998
10
5
6
1 1996
47 1995 - 1996
3
14 1996 - 1996
8 1997 - 1997
13 1996 - 1996
21 1996 - 1996
2
9 1997 - 1998
16 1997 - 1997
12 1997 - 1998
35 1997 - 1998
22 1996 - 1997
31 1996 - 1996
20 1997 - 1997
35 1997 - 1998
71 1996 - 1997
3
14 1996 - 1996
12 1996 - 1997
16 1996 - 1996
5 1998 - 1998
8
10 1997 - 1997
10 1997 - 1998
18 1998 - 1998
5 1996 - 1996
13 1985 - 1996
8 1997 - 1998
28 1997 - 1998
49 1996 - 1996
22 1996
12 1996 - 1996
13 1996 - 1996
11 1997 - 1998
7 1997 - 1997
7 1996 - 1996
8 1997 - 1997
2
23 1998 - 1998
3
9 1996
9 1997 - 1998
3
9 1997 - 1997
3
2
7 1998 - 1998
3
6 1997 - 1997
4 1998
4
19 1996 - 1997
7 1997 - 1997
2
9 1996 - 1997
1 1998
43 1996 - 1998
17 1997 - 1998
49 1996 - 1998
6 1997 - 1997
10 1996
2
2
This document is an NIWC paper on a North/South Council. It focuses on proposing a model that would derive its authority from the agreement, but then have democratic accountability. There are also some mechanisms built in in the case of bad faith.
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The Quill Project has received one-time, non-exclusive use of the papers in this collection from Bowdoin College Library to make them available online as part of Writing Peace.
Subseries 2 (M202.7.2) Commission Documents (1995-1998), Series 7 (M202.7) Northern Ireland Records (1995-2008), George J. Mitchell Papers, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine, digitized by the Quill Project at https://quillproject.net/resource_collections/125.